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1. Introduction 
In recent years many studies have analysed the relationship between credit default 
swaps (CDS) and bond spreads for corporate as well as for emerging sovereign 
reference entities.1 However, the relation between sovereign CDS and bond markets in 
developed countries has not attracted much interest until very recently, mainly for two 
reasons. First, sovereign CDS and bond spreads in developed countries have been 
typically very low and stable given the perceived high credit quality of most issuers (see 
Table 1). Second, trading activity in this segment of the CDS market was typically low. 
However, the global financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 triggered an unprecedented deterioration in public finances of the 
world’s major advanced economies in a peacetime period. Since 2010, some countries 
in the euro area, including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, have faced some 
episodes of heightened turbulence in their sovereign debt markets. Against this context, 
the levels of perceived credit risk and the volume of trading activity in the sovereign 
CDS markets in many advanced economies have increased. 
The existing literature on credit risk has paid some attention to investigating the 
relationship between the corporate bond market and the corporate CDS markets, but 
only a few papers have studied whether the empirical regularities identified in the 
corporate markets, including those related to price discovery, are also found in the case 
of sovereign reference entities. The aim of this paper is to shed light on these latter 
issues within the context of the recent episodes of sovereign-debt crises in several 
countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU).  
Specifically, we analyse the theoretical equivalence relation between the sovereign bond 
yield spread (with respect to a risk-free benchmark) and the corresponding CDS 
                                                          
1 We discuss the related literature in Section 2. 
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spread.2 Abstracting from market frictions and other contractual clauses, both spreads 
should reflect the same information on the credit risk of a given reference entity and 
therefore should be equal. In other words, the basis, defined as the difference between 
the CDS spread and the corresponding bond spread, should be zero. If the basis differs 
from zero, the differences should be purely random and unrelated to any systematic 
factor. Moreover, in such a frictionless scenario, both spreads should incorporate the 
credit-risk information in a similar way, i.e., both markets should be equally efficient in 
terms of the process of credit-risk price discovery.  
The current European sovereign debt crisis poses a particularly interesting scenario to 
test for the previous hypotheses. In particular, we analyse the differences in the 
informational content of the EMU sovereign bond and CDS spreads. First, we study the 
possible causes of the deviations between the bonds and the CDS spreads. We find that 
the counterparty risk indicator has a negative and significant effect on the basis, 
especially after September 2008, when some of the most active protection sellers began 
to face financial difficulties. Funding costs have a negative effect on the basis due to 
their stronger effect on the demand for bonds relative to the demand for CDS, as the 
latter require less funding to take on the same risk position. A higher degree of liquidity 
in the bonds market relative to the CDS market has a positive effect on the basis given 
that ceteris paribus a more liquid bond implies a lower bond yield and spread. The 
effect of the common volatility in the EMU equity markets, proxied by the series 
corresponding to the first common component of the volatility of the EMU countries 
stock market indexes that is obtained from a principal component analysis (PCA), 
affects the basis positively and significantly. This suggests that the CDS market reacts 
                                                          
2 The results are obtained using the German bond as a proxy of the risk-free asset, as in, e.g., Geyer et al. 
(2004), Bernoth et al. (2006), Delis and Mylonidis (2010), Favero et al. (2010), Foley-Fisher (2010), and 
Palladini and Portes (2011), among others. 
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more to changes in the EMU stock markets’ volatility than bond market does. The 
demand of safer assets instead of risky assets (flight-to-quality), proxied by the product 
of the decreases in the correlations between the returns of risky and safe assets and the 
volatility for the European stock market, has a negative effect on the basis. This effect is 
due to the increase in the bond spreads that is motivated by the lower yields of the 
German bonds and the lower demand of riskier bonds. The volume of debt purchased by 
the European Central Bank (ECB) in the secondary market that has taken place since 
May 2010 increases the basis significantly. These purchases exert a negative effect on 
bond spreads. The fact that such an effect is not present (or is weaker) in the case of the 
CDS spreads may indicate that ECB interventions affect other components of bond 
prices other than default risk (e.g., through a fall in the bond’s liquidity premium) or, 
simply, induce some overpricing effect in the bond market for a given level of default 
risk. Finally, the effect of the lagged basis suggests a high degree of persistence and, 
hence, a relatively low speed of adjustment of the basis. 
Second, we address the question of which market leads the credit-risk price-discovery 
process. To this aim, we follow a dynamic price-discovery approach based on Gonzalo 
and Granger (1995). Our analysis reveals that the price-discovery process is state-
dependent. Specifically, the levels of the counterparty risk and the common volatility in 
EMU equity markets, and the successive agreements of private banks to accept losses 
on their holdings of Greek bonds impair the ability of the CDS market to lead the price-
discovery process. The effect of counterparty risk is due to the perception of a lower 
quality of protection sold in the CDS market when this risk is high. The effect of the 
EMU equity markets volatility could be due to the fact that the information contained in 
bond spreads is more reliable during periods of high global risk. The agreements of 
private banks to accept losses on their holdings of Greek bonds could have caused a 
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lack of confidence among investors in the CDS market after such agreements. On the 
other hand, the level of funding costs, the preference of the investors for the safest 
financial assets (flight-to-quality), and the volume of sovereign debt purchased by the 
ECB worsens the efficiency of the bond market in the price-discovery process. Funding 
costs affect bond buyers more than they do CDS buyers, as the CDS market allows for 
more leveraged positions. The investors’ preferences for investing in the safest assets 
could have diminished the demand of most of the EMU countries’ debt, especially debt 
issued by the peripheral economies, in favour of debt issued by countries with high 
credit quality (Germany, United States or United Kingdom) or safe assets (gold). The 
operations of the ECB seem to impair the informational content of bond prices as they 
relate to the actual credit risk of these assets. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the related 
literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 analyses the determinants of the basis. 
Section 5 presents the results of the dynamic price-discovery test. Section 6 contains 
several robustness checks of the main results. Section 7 contains some final remarks. 
2. Related literature 
In this section we focus on the branch of literature on CDS and bond spreads that is 
related to the two questions approached in this paper: determinants of the deviations 
between CDS and bond spreads, and the price-discovery process in bonds and CDS 
markets. 
There is extensive literature addressing the determinants of corporate bond and CDS 
spreads.3 Although this type of analysis is less frequent in the case of sovereign 
                                                          
3 See, for instance, Elton et al. (2001), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Chen et al. (2007), among others 
studying the determinants of the corporate bond spread. The studies analysing the determinants of the 
corporate CDS spreads include Longstaff et al. (2005), and Ericsson et al. (2009). 
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references, this topic is attracting increasing attention in recent times.4 Our aim, 
however, is not to study the determinants of the CDS or the bond spread per se, but, 
rather, a number of factors that may affect the basis with the aim of testing whether both 
markets reflect different information and, if not, of shedding light on the determinants 
of such differences in market informational efficiency. Although the analysis of the 
determinants of the basis is less frequent than the analysis of the individual credit 
spreads, there are some earlier contributions in the literature on sovereign credit 
markets. For instance, Fontana and Scheicher (2010) employ weekly data from 2006 to 
2010 to find that the sovereign bases are significantly linked to the cost of short-selling 
bonds and to country-specific and global risk factors. In his analysis of CDS–bond 
parity, Levy (2009) finds that the frictionless parity relation does not hold for emerging 
markets’ sovereign debt, but he argues that an important part of the deviations can be 
attributed to liquidity effects. Küçük (2010) relates the CDS–bond basis for 21 
emerging market countries between 2004 and 2008 to factors capturing bond liquidity, 
speculation in CDS market, liquidity, equity market performance, and global 
macroeconomic variables. Foley-Fisher (2010) studies the relation between bond and 
CDS spreads for ten EMU countries on the basis of a theoretical model of 
heterogeneous investors’ expectations. He shows that a non-zero basis is consistent with 
a relatively small dispersion in the beliefs of investors on the probability that certain 
European countries would default.5 
We share some of the objectives pursued by these previous papers but in contrast with 
previous analyses, our study of the determinants of the sovereign basis is carried out 
using daily data (instead of weekly) that covers the recent European Monetary Union 
                                                          
4 See, e.g., Codogno et al. (2003), Geyer et al. (2004), Bernoth et al. (2006), Favero et al. (2010), Beber et 
al. (2009), and Mayordomo et al. (2012). 
5 Analyses of the basis in the corporate credit market include Trapp (2009), Nashikkar et al. (2008), and 
Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2009), among others. 
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sovereign debt crisis (May 2010– February 2012). This scenario enables us to evaluate 
the differential effect on government debt and CDS market of several factors not 
addressed in the aforementioned previous studies, including the effect of the purchases 
of sovereign debt by the ECB, the counterparty risk, the financing costs, the flight-to-
quality phenomena, and the several haircuts on the banks’ holdings of Greek bonds 
agreed within that period. There is also a methodological departure in our paper that 
deserves some attention. Specifically, the previous papers typically considered the level 
of the basis as the dependent variable in the regressions run to analyze the effect of its 
potential determinants. In our sample period the basis in levels is not stationary and for 
this reason, we use the relative basis to avoid problems derived from non-stationarity. In 
general, our study differs from these previous papers because we exploit methodological 
tools and data that allow us to offer a more detailed explanation of the deviations from 
the zero-basis benchmark during the European sovereign debt crisis. 
Finally, the most frequent analysis of the CDS–bond relation in corporate and sovereign 
credit markets is based on the concept of price discovery. Most recent papers study 
price discovery based on either Hasbrouck's (1995) or Gonzalo and Granger's (1995) 
methodologies. Both approaches build upon a test based on a Vector Auto Regression 
(VAR) with an Error Correction Term (ECT). For the period before the subprime crisis 
a recurrent empirical finding is that the CDS market reflects the information more 
accurately and quickly than the bond market in the corporate sector (see Blanco et al., 
2005; or Zhu, 2006, among others). Most of the analyses of price discovery in sovereign 
markets have been applied to emerging markets. For instance, Ammer and Cai (2007) 
find that bond spreads lead CDS premia more often than what had been found for 
investment-grade corporate credits. Using data from eight emerging market countries 
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for the period 2003–2006, Bowe et al. (2009) find that the CDS market does not, in 
general, lead price discovery, which appears to be country-dependent. 
The recent crisis has renewed interest in this question in the context of the European 
sovereign debt markets. For instance, Fontana and Scheicher (2010) find that since the 
outset of the crisis, the bond market has had a predominant role in price discovery in 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium, while the CDS market is 
playing a major role in Italy, Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. Palladini and Portes 
(2011) use data on six euro-area countries (Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and 
Portugal) over the period 2004–2011. They find that the CDS market moves ahead of 
the bond market in terms of price discovery for all the countries in the sample except for 
Greece. Delatte et al. (2012) examine a sample of 11 European countries, both high and 
low-yield countries during the period 2008-2010 and find evidence that the relation 
between CDS premiums and bond spreads is not linear. The authors find that in periods 
of turbulence the CDS could drive up the bond interest rates of sovereign nations, even 
when the CDS market is relatively smaller than bond market. All these analyses have 
been carried out based on measures of price discovery that are obtained using the 
information for the entire sample period analysed at once. However, as argued by 
Longstaff (2010), the price-discovery process in financial markets may well be state-
dependent. Thus, Delis and Mylonidis (2010) study the dynamic interrelation between 
bond and CDS spreads of several peripheral countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain) during the period July 2004 to May 2010 on the basis of a Granger causality test. 
They find bidirectional causality during periods of financial distress. 
In the spirit of Longstaff’s (2010) conjecture and Delatte et al.’s (2011) findings, we 
perform a state-dependent price-discovery analysis. Our paper estimates for the first 
time Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) price-discovery metrics over time. The use of this 
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test allows us to overcome the bidirectional causality issue, which is commonly found 
by using the Granger causality test (see Delis and Mylonidis, 2010). We find 
methodological questions of the utmost importance given that determining which 
market leads at every period is essential to shed light on the factors that may influence 
the quality of a given market in terms of its power to contribute to the price-formation 
process. Our study offers, in our view, an interesting contribution because most pre-
crisis evidence supported the leading role of the CDS market in most cases. However, 
our results here suggest that during the collapses of Bear Stearns (February, 2008) and 
of Lehman-AIG (September, 2008), as well as during acute periods of stress in the 
Eurozone related to the episodes of Greece’s debt rescheduling (June-August, 2011) the 
bond market led the price-discovery process. A similar reflection to the one that 
reinforces the contribution of this paper in the analysis of the determinants of the basis 
applies also in relation to the sample and the battery of variables employed in the 
section of the price discovery analysis performed in this paper. Thus, another important 
difference between our approach and the one followed in some previous contributions is 
that we offer a separate analysis of the factors driving the price discovery metrics over 
time. 
3. Data 
The data consists of daily 5-year sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads for eleven 
EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) from January 2004 to February 2012. Bond 
yields are obtained from Reuters and CDS spreads from Credit Market Analysis 
(CMA), which reports data (bid, ask, and mid) sourced from 30 buy-side firms, 
including major global investment banks, hedge funds, and asset managers. 
10 
 
Table 1 reports the main properties of the data. As evident from this table, average CDS 
rates vary substantially across countries and periods. For the period 2004–2008, the 
lowest average CDS spread was 5 basis points (bp) for Germany and the highest one 
was 23 bp points for Greece. For the same period, the lowest average bond spread was 4 
bp for both France and The Netherlands, and the highest average was 25 bp for Greece. 
For the period 2009–2012, the lowest annual average CDS spread was 31 bp for Finland 
in 2010 and the highest annual average was 4,013 bp for Greece in period that 
comprises 2011 and two months of 2012 (being the maximum daily CDS spread at 
21,162 bp on February 28th, 2012). The lowest annual average bond spread was -6 bp 
for Finland in 2010 and the highest was 2,548 bp for Greece in 2011-2012.6 We observe 
an increase in both the average and the volatility of CDS and bond spreads over the 
subsequent years (from 2009 on) in most of the countries and especially in the 
peripheral ones (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy). We note that CDS spreads 
are on average higher than bond spreads in most of the countries, that is, the basis is 
positive (some of the most significant exceptions are Ireland and Portugal in 2011-2012 
and Greece in 2009 and 2010). Figure 1 shows the evolution of the CDS-bond basis for 
the peripheral and core countries.  We observe frequent deviations between CDS and 
bond spreads being such deviations more intense after the end of 2008 due to the effect 
of the global financial crisis that emerged after Lehman Brothers collapse in September 
2008. These deviations are observed for both the countries less affected by the crisis and 
the ones with a weak fiscal position.  
< Insert Table 1 here> 
< Insert Figure 1 here> 
                                                          
6 The negative sign for the bond spread in Finland in 2010 is due to the fact that the average yield of the 
Finnish bond was lower than for the German bond during the second half of year 2010. 
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As for the rest of the data used in the subsequent estimations, the information for the 
measure of common volatility in the EMU stock markets indexes is obtained from 
Reuters. To capture funding costs we use the difference between the 90-day US AA-
rated commercial paper interest rates for financial companies and the 90-day US T-bill, 
both from Datastream. We employ liquidity measures for the sovereign CDS and bonds, 
which are obtained from the bond and CDS bid–ask spreads. Bond bid–ask prices are 
obtained from Reuters, while CDS bid–ask spreads come from CMA. To proxy for the 
counterparty risk on the side of CDS dealers, we employ the CDS spreads of the 14 
banks most active as dealers in the CDS market. These CDS spreads are obtained from 
CMA. The information regarding the European Central Bank (ECB) bond purchases, 
which took place after May 2010, was obtained from the ECB webpage. To compute 
the flight-to-quality indicator we use information on the prices for safe and risky assets. 
The prices for the safe assets refer to the benchmark 10-year Government bonds of 
Germany, United Kingdom and United States, which are obtained from Datastream; and 
the Thomson Reuters contributed spot gold multi-contributor index (commodity cash) 
which is obtained from Reuters. The prices for the risky assets refer to the Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch global high yield and emerging markets, and the broad 
corporate BBB bond indexes which are obtained from Datastream; and the MSCI World 
Index also from Datastream. 
4. The determinants of the basis 
Suppose that an investor buys a bond at its par value with a maturity equal to T years 
and a given yield-to-maturity equal to ytm. Also, assume that at the same time the 
investor buys protection on such reference entity for T years in the CDS market and the 
premium of such contract is s. The investor has eliminated the default risk associated 
with the underlying bond and the investor’s net annual return is equal to ytm – s. Absent 
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any friction, arbitrage forces would imply that the net return should be equal to the T-
year risk-free rate, which we denote by r. Hence, in equilibrium, ytm – r = s where ytm 
– r is the bond spread and s is the CDS spread. The fact that recurrent non-zero bases 
seem to be common during the crisis period (see Figure 1) may be symptomatic of the 
presence of other restrictions and frictions that prevent a perfect timeless alignment 
between the CDS and the bond spreads. In this section we test whether the differences 
between the CDS and bond spreads are purely random or, alternatively, whether they 
are related to any market-specific or global factors. Due to observations corresponding 
to the last months of 2010, the year 2011, and the months of 2012 included in the 
sample; the basis behaves like a non-stationary variable. For this reason, instead of 
analysing the determinants of the basis we study the determinants of the relative basis, 
defined as the difference between the CDS and bond spreads relative to the CDS 
spread.7 We consider the following potential explanatory factors: 
a. Counterparty Risk. In principle, the higher the counterparty risk of the seller of a 
CDS, the lower the CDS price should be as a result of the lower quality of protection. 
We test for this effect by using the first principal component obtained from the CDS 
spreads of the main 14 banks that act as dealers in that market.8 The first principal 
component series should reflect the common default probability and, hence, it is akin to 
an aggregate measure of counterparty risk.9 Actually, the first principal component for 
the series of CDS spreads of this set of dealers explains 86% of the total variance of the 
                                                          
7 We use the CDS spread instead of the average credit spread (simple mean of the CDS and the bond 
spreads) in the denominator of the relative basis because the bond spread takes negative values and zero 
values for some of the observations in the sample.  
8 The 14 main dealers are: Bank of America, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche 
Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of Scotland, Societé Generale, 
UBS, and Wachovia/Wells Fargo. These dealers are the most active global derivatives dealers and are 
known as the G14 (see, for instance, ISDA Research Notes (2010) on the Concentration of OTC 
Derivatives among Major Dealers).   
9 The use of the dealers’ CDS spreads as a proxy of counterparty risk is based on the Arora et al. (2009) 
study, which analyses the existence of counterparty risk in the corporate CDS market. 
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observed variables. We use the counterparty risk variable lagged one period to avoid 
problems of endogeneity derived from the potential contemporaneous effects of the 
banks’ activity on sovereign credit spreads.10 
b. Liquidity. In theory, one would expect that higher liquidity in the bond market 
relative to the CDS market would go hand in hand with a higher basis, since a more 
liquid bond implies a lower spread in that market. To test for relative liquidity effects, 
we construct a ratio of relative liquidity between the CDS and the bond. Specifically, 
the degree of liquidity in the CDS market is proxied by the bid–ask spread of the CDS 
premium. The higher this spread is, the lower the degree of liquidity in the CDS market. 
A similar measure of liquidity is computed for the bond market. The ratio between both 
measures is taken as indicative of the relative liquidity in the CDS market vis-à-vis the 
bond market. As this ratio rises, liquidity in the CDS market relative to the bond market 
falls. Therefore the basis would, in principle, increase. 
c. Financing Costs. One would expect that higher financing costs would lower the 
demand for bonds and could lead to a decrease in prices, and therefore to higher bond 
spreads. The effect of funding costs on CDS spreads should be weaker given that in this 
case the required amount of funding to get the same (gross) risk position is lower (i.e., 
risk–leverage is higher in the case of the CDS investment). For this reason, in principle, 
an increase in financing costs would have a negative effect on the basis. Due to the 
difficulty in obtaining data on institution-level funding constraints, we use the spread 
between financial commercial paper and T-bill rates as a common proxy for the funding 
constraints faced by financial global intermediaries, as in Acharya et al. (2007). 
Specifically, we use the spread between the 90-day US AA-rated commercial paper 
interest rates for the financial companies and the 90-day US T-bill. 
                                                          
10 We have used the counterparty risk variable lagged one week and the average level of counterparty risk 
one month before each date and find similar results. 
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d. Common volatility in European Monetary Union equity markets: As an 
additional potential explanatory variable for the basis, we consider a measure of the 
EMU volatility index or EMU risk premium. If both the CDS and bond spreads are 
prices for the same credit risk, the effect of this measure on the basis should not 
significantly differ from zero. However, a significant non-zero effect would suggest that 
one of the markets reacts more to common changes in the volatility of the EMU stock 
markets. To control for the fact that volatility could be priced differently in the two 
markets, we use the previous risk factor as an additional explanatory variables. The 
volatility of the EMU stock markets is proxied by the first principal component obtained 
from the squared of the stock indexes’ returns of the 11 countries that form the sample 
of this study. The first principal component series should reflect the common volatility 
in the euro zone and explains 72% of the total variance in the observed variables. 
e. Flight-to-quality indicator: a flight-to-quality episode can be defined as an event in 
which there is a decrease in the correlation of the safe and risky assets in response to a 
high level of market turbulences or market downturns. We construct the flight-to-
quality indicator from the relation between the prices of safe assets (Government bonds 
of Germany, United Kingdom and United States; and gold) and risky assets (global high 
yield and emerging markets and broad corporate BBB bond indexes; and a global stock 
market index such as the MSCI World Index). We first express the indexes in the same 
scale by assigning value 100 to the observations corresponding to the 1st of January 
2004 (the beginning of the sample period) and then take the averages for similar groups 
of assets.11 We define the flight-to-quality indicator as the product of the decreases in 
the correlations between the returns of risky and safe assets, which are estimated by 
                                                          
11 We construct an indexed price for the three countries’ Government bond indexes and another index for 
the global high yield plus emerging markets and broad corporate BBB indexes. Then, we obtain the 
average value of the index for each category of assets (safe and risky assets) by calculating the average of 
the high quality sovereign bonds and gold indexed prices on the one hand, and the global high yield bond 
and the MSCI Index standardized prices on the other hand. 
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means of a dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) GARCH model of Engle (2002), and 
the volatility for the European stock market, which is measured by means of the 
VSTOXX implied volatility index.12 We assign value zero to the observations 
corresponding to dates when the correlations are increasing instead of decreasing and to 
the observations before the 5th of November 2009.13 The demand for safer assets in 
detriment of other risky assets observed in periods of financial distress (flight-to-
quality) should have a negative effect on the basis due to the decrease of bond prices or 
equivalently, the increase in the bond spreads; especially the ones of the peripheral 
countries. This increase may occur for two reasons, on the one hand the flight-to-quality 
would lead to lower yields of the German bonds, which are the ones used as the 
benchmark to compute the bond spreads. On the other hand, the demand of riskier 
bonds would diminish in favour of the safest assets (i.e. German, U.K., or U.S. 
Government bonds or gold). 
f. Volume of Debt Purchased by the European Central Bank:  We use as an 
additional explanatory variable the amount of sovereign debt purchased by the ECB in 
the secondary market from May 2010 onwards. This information is available only on a 
weekly basis, and so the effect of the ECB debt purchases is proxied by the amount of 
debt that was purchased the week before the current date.  These purchases are 
supposed to decrease both CDS and bond spreads, but in principle it is natural to think 
that they would have a more direct effect on bond prices. Thus, following these 
                                                          
12 The VSTOXX Index is based on EURO STOXX 50 real time options prices and is designed to reflect 
the market expectations of near-term up to long-term volatility by measuring the square root of the 
implied variance across all options of a given time to expiration. The VSTOXX information is obtained 
from Datastream. 
13 At this date Greece revealed that its real budget deficit was 12.7% of GDP (more than twice the 
previous disclosed) and it is generally considered as the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
As the flight-to-quality refers to the demand of sovereign debt we avoid including in the indicator 
potential episodes of flight-to-quality in which the bond spreads for the core and peripheral countries 
were very low and of a similar magnitude. 
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interventions, the bond spread would decrease more than the decrease in the CDS 
spread, thus affecting the basis positively. 
g. Dummy for the Private Banks’ Agreements to Accept Losses on Their Holdings 
of Greek Bonds: The proposal launched in July 2011, and restated in October 2011, for 
an agreement among banks to accept a voluntary haircut on their holdings of Greek 
bonds, which could come without the activation of the CDS contracts, could have 
generated a lack of confidence among institutional investors in the CDS market. This 
last effect may lead to a lower quality of the protection sold, which should imply lower 
CDS spreads and a lower basis. For this reason, we use as additional regressors two 
dummy variables that are equal to 1 after the banks agreed on the 21st of July 2011 and 
the 27th of October 2011 to accept 21% and 50% losses on their holdings of Greek 
bonds, respectively; and zero before that date. 
h. Lagged Basis: The lag of the basis should absorb any past information transmitted 
into the current observation. We expect a positive sign for this variable. The larger the 
coefficient, the more persistent the deviation between CDS and bond spreads. 
We estimate the coefficients for the above factors for the period spanning January 2004 
to February 2012 using a fixed-effects estimation procedure that is robust to 
heteroskedasticity.14 We use the bootstrap methodology to correct for any potential bias 
in the standard errors due to the use of generated regressors. The results are reported in 
Column 1 of Table 2. Column 2 of that table reports the standardised coefficients (i.e., 
the regression coefficient as in Column 1 multiplied by one standard deviation of the 
corresponding explanatory variable). Most of the variables, including the dependent 
variable, are expressed on a per unit basis with some exceptions. The volume of bonds 
purchased by the ECB in a given week is defined in billions of euros. The common 
                                                          
14 We have checked the order of integration of the above factors and find that they are stationary. 
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volatility in the EMU is obtained from the squared returns of the stock market indexes 
which are defined on a per unit basis. The flight-to-quality indicator is obtained by 
multiplying two variables (correlation between safe and risky assets returns and 
VSTOXX implied volatility index) which are expressed on a per unit basis.  
The counterparty risk proxy has a negative and significant effect, as expected, which 
confirms its relevance on the levels of the CDS spreads. Funding costs have a negative 
effect due to their stronger effect on the demand for bonds relative to the demand for 
CDS that requires a lower amount of funding. A low degree of liquidity in the CDS 
market relative to the bond market has a positive effect given that a more liquid bond 
implies a lower bond spread. The proxy for the EMU volatility seems to be priced 
differently in both markets. The positive and significant effect could be explained by the 
fact that the CDS spread reacts more to the variation in aggregate or macro factors, such 
as the common volatility of the EMU stock market indexes, than the bond spreads. This 
feature has been documented by Alexopoulou et al. (2009) and Mayordomo and Peña 
(2011). As expected, the flight to quality indicator has a negative and significant effect 
on the basis suggesting an increase in the bond spreads. The dummies for the banks’ 
willingness to accept losses on their holdings of Greek bonds have negative signs, as 
expected, but they are not significant at any standard significance level. In line with the 
results of the previous section, we find a high level of persistency in the relative basis. 
That is, there is a relatively low speed of adjustment towards the long-run bond–CDS 
equivalence relation. Finally, the constant term reflects whether the relative basis 
differs, on average, from zero and the magnitude of such deviation. We observe that the 
relative basis is on average significantly positive, suggesting that the bond–CDS 
equivalence relation does not hold even when we take into account the market frictions 
described above and the costs that are needed to trade the basis. Nevertheless, its 
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magnitude is low relative to the average relative basis during the period 2004–2012 
(2.7% relative to 38.2%). Thus, when we take into account the determinants of the 
basis, the magnitude of the average relative deviation is close to zero and is reduced by 
93%. This result confirms the strong influence on these determinants to guarantee the 
bond–CDS equivalence relation. 
The relatively high R-square of this regression is mainly due to the effect of the lagged 
basis. However, it should be noted that the explanatory variables retain a relatively high 
explanatory power even when we ignore the lagged basis, in which case the R-square is 
0.28. Actually, this is of a similar magnitude to the one reported by Trapp (2009) on a 
daily basis for corporates using firm fixed effects but ignoring the effect of the lagged 
basis. 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
5. Price-Discovery Analysis  
An efficient price-discovery process is characterised by a quick adjustment of market 
prices from the old to the new equilibrium as new information arrives (see, e.g., Yan 
and Zivot, 2007). In the analysis that follows, we show that the price-discovery process 
in the markets for sovereign credit risk in the euro area shows a time-variant pattern 
(Section 5.1). We then try to identify the effect of several potential explanatory 
variables of the dynamic pattern followed by the price-discovery metrics obtained in the 
previous step (Section 5.2). 
5.1. A Dynamic Price-Discovery Metric 
To estimate a time-variant price-discovery metric we extend Gonzalo and Granger’s 
(1995) price-discovery analysis using rolling windows. Gonzalo and Granger’s model 
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of price discovery is based on the following vector error correction model (VECM) 
specification: 
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The above empirical model is a vector autoregressive (VAR) system formed by two 
equations defined from the vector, which includes the bond and CDS spreads of the 
same underlying country, denoted by BSprt and CDSSprt, respectively, and an error 
correction term (ECT) defined by the expression )( 1321 −− −− tt CDSSprBSpr ββα , where 
β2 and β3 are estimated in an auxiliary cointegration regression and the parameter vector 
α’ = (α1, α2) contains the error-correction coefficients measuring each price’s expected 
speed of adjustment. The estimation of the VECM specification is restricted to the 
existence of a cointegration relation between the bond and CDS spreads. This 
cointegration relation appears in the ECT as ( )1321 −− −− tt CDSSprBSpr ββ . The parameters
i,1λ , i,2λ , i,1δ , and i,2δ  for i = 1,..p, with p indicating the total number of lags, contain the 
coefficients of the VAR system that measure the effect of the lagged first difference in 
the CDS and bond spreads on the first difference of such spreads at time t.15  Finally, ut 
denotes a white noise vector. 
The price-discovery metric for the bond and CDS markets, denoted by GGbond and 
GGCDS, respectively, can then be constructed from the elements of the vector α’, which 
contains the coefficients that determine each market’s contribution to price discovery: 
)4(.;
21
1
21
2
αα
α
αα
α
+−
−
=
+−
= CDSBond GGGG  
                                                          
15The optimal number of lags is determined by the Schwarz information criteria. 
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Given that GGBond + GGCDS = 1, we would conclude that the bond (CDS) market leads 
the price-discovery process whenever GGBond is higher (lower) than 0.5. The intuition 
for this is the faster the speed in eliminating the price difference from the long-term 
equilibrium attributable to a given market, the higher the corresponding α according to 
(3), and the higher the price-discovery metric. 
In order to apply the methodology outline above to a dynamic metric of price-discovery 
leadership in the two markets at stake, we estimate the system in equation (3) using 
rolling windows with different lengths: 500, 750, and 1,000 days. To do so, we first 
need to check for the order of integration of the CDS and bond spreads and then for the 
existence of a cointegration relation. An interesting feature is that, on average, the 
estimated metrics do not seem to be very sensitive to the window length. Based on this, 
in the remainder of the paper we focus on 1,000-day windows.16 Using rolling windows 
with a length of 1,000 observations, we find that both CDS and bond spreads are non-
stationary in all the countries and dates.17 We next apply the cointegration test to a total 
of 1,089 1,000-day windows for each of the ten countries to find cointegration between 
both spreads in 6,989 cases (64% of the total). The country with the lowest (highest) 
percentage of cointegration relations is Belgium (Austria) with cointegration in 36% 
(87.5%) of the windows. As we increase the window length from 500 to 750 and to 
1,000 observations, we find a higher number of unit roots and cointegration relations. 
                                                          
16 On the one hand, the 500-day windows enable us to update the influence of the new observations 
quicker than the 1,000-day windows and to estimate the price-discovery metrics for the years 2006 and 
2007. On the other hand, the 1,000-day windows enable us to consider a higher number of price-
discovery metrics per day and country after 2007 due to the existence of a higher percentage of 
cointegration relations for these windows. Actually, the years 2006 and 2007 present the lowest number 
of days with cointegration relations per year. 
17 The number of lags employed in the unit root test is chosen according to the Schwarz information 
criterion. 
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Figure 2 shows the estimated price-discovery metric for the 1,000-day windows for two 
groups of countries in the sample, peripheral and central.18 In particular, we report a 30-
day moving average of the mean price-discovery metrics, which is obtained as an 
equally weighted mean across the ten euro-area countries. An important message in 
Figure 2 is that the price-discovery metrics are not static but rather evolve over time, 
with the relative leadership of the CDS market in the process of price discovery being 
more pronounced around specific dates.  
Specifically, before the Lehman Brothers collapse the CDS market led sovereign risk 
price discovery. This finding is consistent with the results reported by, for example, 
Blanco et al. (2005) or Zhu (2006) in the context of the corporate debt markets. The first 
noticeable rise in the relative leadership of the bond market took place around February 
2008, around the collapse of Bear Stearns. Afterwards, in September 2008, coinciding 
with the fall of Lehman Brothers and AIG, the bond price-discovery metric again 
jumped reaching its highest value at the end of 2008. This pattern suggests that during 
these two specific episodes, the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman-AIG, the bond 
spread led, by a small margin, the price-discovery process. The price-discovery metrics 
show the last significant rebound around the end of June 2011, some days before the 
proposal for an agreement among some private banks in July 2011 to accept a loss of 
21% on their Greek bonds under the implicit presumption that such a voluntary deal 
would not trigger a credit event that would call for the activation of CDS protection. 
Following this, in August 2011 the bond market became the leader in terms of price 
discovery, confirming the role of this market during the most recent phase of the crisis 
                                                          
18 The peripheral group includes Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The core group includes 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and The Netherlands. The window length in all cases is 1,000 days. 
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as the fairest source of information on credit risk.19  The bond market remains as the 
leader in the peripheral countries but losses its informational advantage after December 
2011 in favour of the CDS market in the core countries. 
From a different perspective, we observe a decoupling of the price-discovery measure 
for the core and peripheral countries from the end of 2008 until mid-2011. Starting at 
the end of 2008, it is worth noting that for most of the time the relative efficiency of the 
CDS market in the peripheral countries is significantly higher than for the core 
countries, where the bond market indeed led the price-discovery process for most of 
2009. The difference between the estimated price-discovery metric for both groups of 
countries widened further during 2010. This pattern, which is mainly motivated by a 
sharp increase in the relative efficiency of the CDS market, may reflect the ECB policy 
of buying sovereign debt issued by peripheral countries.  
This core-peripheral countries decoupling persisted until May 2011 when we observed a 
similar trend in both groups of countries of improving the power of the bond market to 
lead price discovery. In particular, after July 2011 the bond market moved ahead of the 
CDS market. This result could be due to the increase of overall risk perception, but it 
also could be due to a lack of confidence of institutional investors in the CDS market 
after the aforementioned proposal for an agreement among the banks to accept a 
voluntary haircut on their Greek bonds without activating the CDS contracts. This 
explanation would fit well with the fact that the price-discovery metric for Greece 
jumps from a value near zero in April 2011 to 1 in July 2011. The price discovery 
metric for Greece remains at its maximum level up to the end of November 2011 and 
then decreases slightly but still supporting a better informational efficiency of the bond 
market until the end of the sample. We observe a new decoupling between the core and 
                                                          
19 This result is in line with the role of the bond market as an appropriate credit-risk measure in crisis 
periods found by Mayordomo et al. (2011b) for the corporate case. 
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peripheral countries which is more pronounced after November 2011. While the bond 
market remains as a fair indicator of credit risk in the peripheral countries, the CDS 
market moved ahead of the bond market in the core countries after that date. 
< Insert Figure 2 here > 
Figure 3 shows the estimated price-discovery metrics for the 1,000-day windows for the 
same two groups of countries (peripheral and core), but it shows the number of 
countries for which we can implement the Gonzalo and Granger methodology (i.e., unit 
roots in both the CDS and bond spreads series are found and both spreads are 
cointegrated). The darker the line is, the higher the number of countries for which the 
analysis can be implemented. We observe that for most of the time, the analysis can be 
implemented in four or more countries. Actually, it can be implemented in eight or 
more countries for long windows of time from the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2009. 
 < Insert Figure 3 here > 
5.2. An Analysis of the Determinants of Market Leadership in Price Discovery  
In this section we aim to shed some light on the dynamic pattern of the price-discovery 
metrics estimated before by regressing them on potential explanatory factors. 
Specifically, for each country we construct a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
when the bond market reflects information more efficiently than the CDS market and 
zero otherwise. This dummy is constructed on the basis of a rolling window estimation 
using 1,000 observations,20 and then it is used as the dependent variable in a Logit 
                                                          
20 When faced with missing values (due to a lack of cointegration relation between the CDS and the bond 
spreads), the value of the dummy is imputed according to the Granger-causality analysis performed 
earlier. For the remaining missing values, the value of the dummy is imputed whenever there is another 
observed value within the next ten days that coincides with the previous price discovery value observed 
and persists at least in the next ten observations. If after a given date there are not cointegration relations 
up to the end of the sample we do not impute any value. For sake of the robustness of this procedure, we 
use the 1,000-observation estimation. Thus, we do not employ the price-discovery metric directly, which 
is a concrete value between 0 and 1, but instead assign a value of one or zero to such metrics, thus 
softening such a strong assumption. We impute 12% of the total observations. 
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regression that includes as regressors the same used in the regression contained in Table 
2, with the exception of the lagged basis. We consider these regressors because they 
have been found to have a significant effect on the deviations from a zero basis.21 
Hence, as this shows that the effect of such regressors is not reflected in the same way 
in the two markets, it seems natural to consider that one market captures better than the 
other the effect of each determinant of the basis. 
The results are reported in Table 3. Column 1 reports the results obtained when we use 
daily price discovery metrics for the period spanning December 2007– February 2012.  
Column 2 contains the marginal effects of the coefficients reported in Column 1. The 
marginal effects of the dummy variables are obtained as the discrete change (from 0 to 
1) in the corresponding variable. All the explanatory variables, including the dependent 
variable, are expressed in percentages with the exception of the bonds purchased by the 
ECB in a given week, defined in billions of euros, and the two dummy haircut 
agreements by banks, which are equal to 1 after the 21st of July 2011 and the 27th of 
October 2011, respectively; and zero before then. The common volatility in the EMU is 
obtained from the squared returns of the stock market indexes which are defined on a 
per unit basis. The flight-to-quality indicator is obtained by multiplying two variables 
(correlation between safe and risky assets returns and VSTOXX implied volatility 
index) which are expressed on a per unit basis.  
One might expect that the higher the counterparty risk, the lower the power of the CDS 
market to adequately reflect the credit risk due to the lower quality of the protection 
sold in this market and, perhaps, the uncertainty around such quality. The sign is the 
expected (positive) and significant. An increase equal to one percentage point in the 
                                                          
21 Although the dummies for the haircut agreements by banks are not significant determinants of the 
basis, we use them to test whether they affect the relative efficiency of the CDS market in the price 
discovery process. 
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counterparty risk measure would increase the contribution of the bond market to the 
leadership of the price discovery process by 5.1%. 
As argued before, funding costs affect the bond market more negatively relative to the 
CDS, as the CDS market allows for higher-leveraged positions. This could explain why 
the funding costs negatively affect the ability of the bond market to anticipate the price 
of credit risk relative to the CDS market. Specifically, we find that an increase of 1% in 
financing cost would decrease the estimated price-discovery metric by 22.3%. 
Surprisingly, the degree of liquidity in the CDS market relative to the bond market does 
not significantly affect the price-discovery metric but, as expected, has a positive effect 
on the dependent variable. Our interpretation of this finding is the following. Under the 
special features of the period under study (financial stress and limited access to 
funding), it seems natural to think that a major determinant of the degree of investors’ 
participation in the bond market (and, hence, of much of the information contained in 
the prices determined therein) is the availability of funding and its cost, rather than the 
magnitude of the bid-ask gap. Furthermore, the relative importance of the bid/ask gap in 
this respect could be of second order if there are some big players in the market, like the 
ECB, buying bonds without any regard to the ongoing bid-ask spreads. Hence, this 
could render the liquidity variable non-significant. 
In line with the results obtained by Mayordomo et al. (2011b) for corporate bonds and 
CDS, the bond spreads tend to reflect credit risk more efficiently than CDS spreads 
during periods of high global risk (high values of the common volatility in EMU equity 
markets). In this sense, the intensification of the Euro area sovereign debt crisis in 2011 
favored the leading role of the sovereign bond market in the price discovery process. In 
particular, according to the estimates above, an increase in the level of the common 
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volatility in the EMU stock markets of 1% would cause a fall of 4.8% in the 
contribution of the CDS market to the price-discovery process. 
The investors’ preferences for investing in the safest assets would diminish the demand 
of most of the EMU countries’ debt, especially the debt issued by the peripheral 
economies, in favour of the debt issued by countries with high credit quality or other 
safe assets such as the gold. For this reason, we find that an increase in the level of the 
flight-to-quality indicator of 1% would cause a fall of 1.1% in the contribution of the 
bond market to the price-discovery process.  
If the ECB’s demand for debt is relatively inelastic with respect to its price then the 
information embedded in the prices formed in that market could reveal less about the 
fundamental value of the corresponding bonds. This hypothesis is confirmed by the 
significant and negative sign of the variable representing the total amount of sovereign 
debt purchased by the ECB.22 An increase of €1 bn in the total amount of debt 
purchased by the ECB leads to a decrease of 0.4% in the ability of the bond market in 
terms of price discovery. For instance, the 16.5 billion euros spent during the first week 
of the ECB’s initial foray into Greek markets through the Securities Markets Program in 
May 2010 could have contributed to a 6.6% fall in the estimated price-discovery metric. 
The total amount purchased by the ECB at the end of the sample period (February 2012) 
was €219.5 bn. 
The proposal for an agreement among private banks in July 2011, and the restatement of 
the agreement in October 11, to accept voluntary losses on their holdings of Greek 
bonds seemed to favour the relative efficiency of the bond markets, according to the 
positive and significant effect of the corresponding dummy variables. Specifically, after 
                                                          
22 Given that we are using historical information on bond and CDS spreads to construct the price-
discovery metric, we now use the stock of debt purchased by the ECB instead of the flow corresponding 
to the previous week. 
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July 21st, 2011, we find a fall of 28% in the contribution of the CDS market to the price-
discovery process. The fall in the contribution of the CDS market after October 27th, 
2011 was 43%. The stronger effect of the October agreement could be explained by the 
increase in the magnitude of the voluntary losses to be accepted by the banks (the new 
haircut was 50% instead of the 21% agreed in July 2011). 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
6. Robustness checks 
6.1 Determinants of the basis 
To discard any bias due to potential collinearity problems, we report the correlation 
matrix for all the factors employed in our analysis (see Table 4). The correlations 
therein are obtained as a weighted average of the correlations between the variables for 
each country in the sample. The strongest correlation (0.71) is the one between the two 
dummies capturing the agreed haircuts on Greek debt. Besides that, the remaining 
correlations are lower than 0.7. In view of this and the low level of the multi-collinearity 
condition number (4.19), i.e. well below the critical value (30), we consider that 
collinearity is unlikely to be a source of concern in our sample. 
 < Insert Table 4 here> 
In our baseline estimation, we have included the gap between U.S. commercial paper 
and T-Bills to approximate a measure of global funding costs, under the assumption that 
participants in sovereign CDS and bond markets could be global, in particular, 
including the largest US financial institutions. Nevertheless, we also consider the 3-
month Euribor-OIS spread as another proxy for financing costs. We first notice that the 
3-month Euribor-OIS spread is highly correlated (0.76) with the indicator of 
counterparty risk as it has been documented earlier (see e.g. Rodriguez-Moreno and 
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Peña, 2012). Thus, we orthogonalize the two variables by excluding from the Euribor-
OIS gap the part that is due to counterparty risk.23 The results obtained using this last 
variable, which are shown in Column 2 of Table 5, do not change materially with 
respect to the estimations obtained using the U.S.-based proxy (baseline specification) 
that are reported in Column 1 of Table 5.24 Regarding the standardised coefficients, the 
strongest effect is the one corresponding to the lagged relative basis, as expected. 
Among the rest of the variables, the strongest effects are the ones coming from the 
financing costs. An increase equal to one standard deviation in this last variable would 
reduce the relative basis by 1%. 
We also address the cross-sectional differences in the relative effects of the explanatory 
variables for the peripheral and core countries by adding interaction terms between the 
variables and two dummies (peripheral-countries dummy and sovereign debt crisis 
dummy). The first dummy takes value one for the peripheral countries and zero for the 
core countries while the second dummy takes value one after November 2009, which 
we consider as the approximate beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis 
following the first news on misreporting of fiscal data in Greece, and zero before. 
Instead of exploiting all the interaction variables at the same time, we introduce them 
one by one to check whether they produce any significant distinctive effect in the 
peripheral countries vis-à-vis the core ones during the crisis. This strategy allows us to 
discard any potential bias due to collinearity, given that the correlations between some 
of these interaction variables are high (in some case above 0.8). 
                                                          
23 Specifically, we regress the Euribor-OIS gap on the counterparty risk variable and a constant term and 
use the residuals plus the constant as the new funding cost variable. 
24 A similar conclusion is obtained in the analysis of the drivers of the price discovery metrics when we 
use the 3-month Euribor-OIS as the proxy for financing costs. The coefficient for the new variable (-1.57) 
is also significantly different from zero and non-significantly different to the one obtained for the baseline 
financing costs proxy (-1.55). The sign and coefficients of the remaining variables are also similar to the 
ones in Column 1 of Table 3. 
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Interestingly, we do not find any significant effect from any of the variables when they 
are introduced individually. They only interaction variable with a significant effect is 
the purchases of public debt in the secondary market by the ECB when interacted with 
the subset of peripheral countries that had benefited from fully-fledged multilateral 
program of financial support by the end of the sample period, that is, Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal. The debt purchases by the ECB had a significant effect on the prices of 
the sovereign debt issued by these last three countries, but not a differential effect on 
Spain and Italy, with respect to the core countries. Our interpretation of this result is 
based on the conjecture that the ECB purchases of debt under its Securities Markets 
Program on the previous subset of “program countries” relative to their total amount of 
debt outstanding was much larger than the corresponding ratio of the ECB purchased 
debt relative to the total debt of Italy and Spain.25 Detailed results of this estimation are 
reported in Column 3 of Table 5. 
< Insert Table 5 here > 
6.2 Price-Discovery Analysis  
To confirm that our results are not influenced by potential non-linearities in the price 
discovery process as documented in Delatte et al. (2012), we use an alternative 
estimation methodology. In particular, to make this alternative estimation strategy 
consistent and comparable to the one followed in our paper we have to: (1) estimate 
dynamically a non-linear model of price discovery using rolling windows; (2) avoid 
using information on the drivers of price discovery to determine the regime or state 
given that these variables will be used to identify their contribution to price discovery; 
and (3) apply this procedure country by country.  
                                                          
25 See the estimations of Barclays Capital in the report “ECB SMP: Marking to Market news” by January 
2012. 
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Based on the previous requirements, we use a threshold VECM-model for each country 
to check whether the results change due to the non-linearities in the price discovery 
process. The marginal effects of the drivers of price discovery under the new 
specification are in Column 2 of Table 6. Column 1 of Table 6 reports the baseline 
marginal results obtained with the linear dynamic price discovery analysis. 
We observe that the marginal effect of counterparty risk, financing costs, common 
volatility, and ECB debt purchases are of a similar magnitude and degree of 
significance. The marginal effects of the two dummies, although also significant, are of 
a lower magnitude. The flight-to-quality indicator is non-significant now. The liquidity 
variable is not significant at 5% level and its marginal effect is negligible in line with 
the baseline result. 
Finally, we note that the use of daily price-discovery metrics obtained with 1,000-day 
rolling windows implies that the new information added in a given day is small relative 
to the information of the other 999 days, which persists from one estimation to the next. 
Faced with this, we check whether the results hold independently or whether we use 
daily or monthly linear price-discovery metrics. The marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables that are obtained using monthly information are reported in Column 3 of Table 
6. The comparison of the results reported in Column 1 confirms that the results are 
robust regarding daily or monthly metrics in terms of the magnitudes and levels of 
significance of the explanatory variables. 
< Insert Table 6 here > 
7. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the extent to which the sovereign CDS and bond markets reflect the 
same information on their prices in the context of the European Monetary Union. In 
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approaching this question, we follow a two-stage approach, whose main insights are 
summarized below. 
We first analyse the role of some potential determinants of the basis, including several 
sources of risk (counterparty risk and the volatility of the EMU stock market indexes) 
and other market frictions. In particular, we find that the counterparty risk indicator has 
a negative and significant effect on the basis. Funding costs have a negative effect on 
the basis, while a high liquidity in the bond market relative to the CDS market has a 
positive effect. The EMU risk premium measured by means of the series corresponding 
to the common component of the volatility of the EMU countries stock market indexes 
affects the basis positively and significantly. A “flight-to-quality” indicator has a 
negative effect on the basis. The European Central Bank’s purchases of sovereign debt 
in the secondary market in May 2010 were found to positively and significantly affect 
the basis. 
We then conduct a dynamic analysis of market leadership in the price-discovery 
process. An important result here is that the price-discovery process is clearly state-
dependent. To shed some light on the determinants of such a state-contingent pattern of 
relative market informational efficiency we relate our measure of price-discovery to the 
set of factors identified in the previous stage as potential determinants of the bond-CDS 
basis. Specifically, the levels of the counterparty risk and the common volatility in 
EMU equity markets, and the banks’ agreements to accept losses on their holdings of 
Greek bonds impair the ability of the CDS market to lead the price discovery process.  
On the other hand, the funding costs, the flight-to-quality indicator and the volume of 
debt purchases by the ECB worsen the efficiency of the bond market. 
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Table 1: CDS and Bond Spreads Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the CDS and bond spreads main descriptive statistics 
(mean and standard deviation) for different time periods (2004–2008, 
2009, 2010, and 2011-2012). We group years 2011 and 2012 because 
there are only two months of observation for 2012. The bond spreads 
are obtained as the difference between country A’s yield and the 
German yield. 
 
 
Bond CDS
Mean 7 8
Std.Dev. 12 21
Mean 52 104
Std.Dev. 25 49
Mean 42 79
Std.Dev. 12 13
Mean 59 90
Std.Dev. 14 33
Mean 9 8
Std.Dev. 17 14
Mean 49 63
Std.Dev. 29 33
Mean 57 110
Std.Dev. 27 43
Mean 136 187
Std.Dev. 47 51
Mean 5 6
Std.Dev. 12 9
Mean 34 37
Std.Dev. 21 19
Mean -6 31
Std.Dev. 13 3
Mean 18 44
Std.Dev. 26 18
Mean 4 6
Std.Dev. 9 9
Mean 23 40
Std.Dev. 12 20
Mean 24 70
Std.Dev. 8 18
Mean 41 107
Std.Dev. 18 39
Mean 5
Std.Dev. 7
Mean 36
Std.Dev. 18
Mean 40
Std.Dev. 8
Mean 58
Std.Dev. 20
2011
2004-2008
2011
2009
2010
2004-2008
2004-2008
2009
2010
2011
2004-2008
2009
2009
2010
2009
2010
2011
2011
2010
2004-2008
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
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Table 1 (Cont.): CDS and Bond Spreads Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Mean 25 23
Std.Dev. 36 36
Mean 166 165
Std.Dev. 78 54
Mean 779 682
Std.Dev. 290 242
Mean 1644 2075
Std.Dev. 506 1452
Mean 4 6
Std.Dev. 8 12
Mean 30 53
Std.Dev. 18 30
Mean 19 45
Std.Dev. 7 8
Mean 24 55
Std.Dev. 16 22
Mean 9 13
Std.Dev. 20 31
Mean 151 190
Std.Dev. 56 62
Mean 262 302
Std.Dev. 164 154
Mean 821 730
Std.Dev. 235 145
Mean 19 19
Std.Dev. 25 27
Mean 74 103
Std.Dev. 32 39
Mean 109 165
Std.Dev. 40 42
Mean 218 246
Std.Dev. 101 115
Mean 13 14
Std.Dev. 20 19
Mean 71 76
Std.Dev. 37 27
Mean 251 293
Std.Dev. 111 116
Mean 918 767
Std.Dev. 366 273
Mean 8 12
Std.Dev. 15 20
Mean 54 89
Std.Dev. 30 26
Mean 152 205
Std.Dev. 74 67
Mean 257 295
Std.Dev. 66 64
2004-2008
2009
2010
2011
2011
2004-2008
2009
2010
2004-2008
2009
2011
2011
2004-2008
2009
2010
2004-2008
2010
2004-2008
2011
2009
2010
2009
2010
2011
Spain
Greece
The Netherlands
Ireland
Italy
Portugal
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Table 2: Determinants of the Basis 
This table reports the effect of the potential determinants of the basis based on a 
fixed-effects regression robust to heteroskedasticity. Column (1) reports the 
effect of such determinants for the period spanning January 2004– February 
2012. This column contains the explanatory variables’ coefficients and the 
standard errors between brackets. *** (** and *) indicates whether the 
coefficients are significant at a significance level of 1% (5% and 10%). The 
bootstrap methodology is employed to correct any potential bias in the standard 
errors. Column 2 reports the standardised coefficient (i.e., the regression 
coefficient as in Column 1 multiplied by the standard deviation of the 
corresponding explanatory variable).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
Counterparty risk  -0.150*** -0.005
(0.06)
Ratio CDS/bond liquidity 0.003** 0.002
(0.00)
Financing costs  -2.011*** -0.010
(0.30)
Common volatilty of EMU countries' stock index returns 3.184*** 0.006
(0.71)
Bonds purchased by ECB 0.0005*** 0.001
(0.00)
Dummy haircut agreement by banks (July 11) 0.001 0.000
(0.00)
Dummy haircut agreement by banks (October 11) -0.003 -0.001
(0.00)
Flight-to-quality indicator  -0.461*** -0.002
(0.12)
Lagged relative basis 0.933*** 0.558
(0.01)
Constant 0.028***
(0.00)
Number of observations 17,057
Wald Chi2 statistic 49,206
Prob>Wald Chi2 0
Adjusted R-squared 0.906
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Table 3: Determinants of the Price-Discovery Metrics 
This table reports the effect of the potential determinants of the price-discovery 
metrics using a panel fixed-effects logistic regression robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The price-discovery metrics are obtained from Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) 
methodology using rolling windows of 1,000 observations. The dependent variable 
takes a value of 1 when the bond spread reflects the information more efficiently than 
the CDS spread, while a value equal to 0 indicates that the CDS spread leads the price 
discovery process. The bond spread is defined as the difference between country A’s 
yield and the German yield. Column (1) reports the results obtained when we use 
daily price-discovery metrics for the period spanning December 2007– February 
2012. Column (2) includes the marginal effects of the coefficients in Column (1). The 
sample length is due to the use of the first 1,000 observations to estimate the price-
discovery metric. The table contains the explanatory variables’ coefficients and the 
standard errors between brackets. *** (** and *) indicates whether the coefficients or 
effects are significant at 1% (5% and 10%) level. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
Counterparty risk 0.354*** 0.051***
(0.02)
Ratio CDS/bond liquidity 0.000 0.000
(0.00)
Financing costs  -1.549***  -0.223***
(0.08)
Common volatilty of EMU countries' stock index returns 33.144** 0.048**
(14.48)
Bonds purchased by ECB  -0.028***  -0.004***
(0.00)
Dummy haircut agreement by banks (July 11) 1.974*** 0.284***
(0.18)
Dummy haircut agreement by banks (October 11) 2.983*** 0.429***
(0.24)
Flight-to-quality indicator  -7.816**  -0.011**
(3.91)
Constant  -2.392***
(0.14)
Number of observations 8817 8817
Wald Chi2 statistic 1723 1723
Prob>Wald Chi2 0 0
Log pseudolikelihood -3393 -3393
Pseudo R2 0.346 0.346
40 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlation among the factors employed as the determinants of the basis and the price discovery metrics. The correlations 
are obtained as a weighted average of the correlations between the variables for each country in the sample (excluding Germany). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counterparty risk
Ratio CDS/Bond liquidity 0.16
Financing costs 0.08 0.22
Common volatility EMU 0.33 0.14 0.35
Bonds purchased by ECB 0.39 -0.09 -0.12 0.08
Dummy haircut July 11 0.56 -0.08 -0.16 0.09 0.52
Dummy haircut October 11 0.44 -0.04 -0.12 0.02 0.22 0.71
Flight-to-quality 0.13 -0.06 -0.11 0.02 0.07 0.16 0.07
Lagged relative basis -0.09 0.01 -0.31 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.00
Dummy 
haircut 
October 11
Flight-to-
quality
Lagged 
relative 
basis
Counterpart
y risk
Ratio 
CDS/Bond 
liquidity
Financing 
costs
Common 
volatility 
EMU stock 
indexes
Bonds 
purchased 
by ECB
Dummy 
haircut July 
11
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Table 5: Robustness Checks for the Determinants of the Basis 
This table reports the effect of the potential determinants of the daily basis based on a 
fixed-effects regression robust to heteroskedasticity. Column (1) reports the baseline 
effect of such determinants for the period spanning January 2004– February 2012 (the 
same effects reported Column 1 of Table 2). Column 2 reports the results obtained when 
the financing costs measure is proxied by means of the 3-month Euribor-OIS spread 
instead of the gap between U.S. commercial paper and T-Bills. Due to the high 
correlation between Euribor-OIS and the indicator of counterpart risk we orthogonalize 
the Euribor-OIS gap with respect to the counterparty risk variable. Column 3 reports the 
results obtained when we add as an additional explanatory variable the purchases of 
public debt in the secondary market by the ECB interacted with a dummy variable for 
the subset of peripheral countries that had benefited from fully-fledged multilateral 
program of financial support by the end of the sample period (Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal). This table contains the explanatory variables’ coefficients and the standard 
errors between brackets. *** (** and *) indicates whether the coefficients are 
significant at a significance level of 1% (5% and 10%). The bootstrap methodology is 
employed to correct any potential bias in the standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Counterparty risk  -0.150***  -0.207***  -0.151***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Ratio CDS/bond liquidity 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Financing costs (U.S. commercial paper-Tbills)  -2.011***  -2.014***
(0.30) (0.28)
Financing costs (3-month Euribor-OIS)  -3.319***
(0.50)
Common volatilty of EMU countries' stock index returns 3.184*** 2.433*** 3.184***
(0.71) (0.68) (0.66)
Bonds purchased by ECB 0.0005*** 0.0006** 0.0002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Bonds purchased by ECB interacted with a dummy for the 0.0009**
   countries that received financial assistance (Gre, Ire, Por) (0.00)
Dummy haircut agreement by banks (July 11) 0.001 0.005 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dummy haircut agreement by banks (October 11) -0.003 0.001 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Flight-to-quality indicator  -0.461***  -0.475***  -0.461***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Lagged relative basis 0.933*** 0.936*** 0.933***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.028***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of observations 17,057 17,057 17,057
Adjusted R-squared 0.906 0.906 0.906
42 
 
Table 6: Robustness Checks for the Determinants of the Price-Discovery 
Metrics 
This table reports the marginal effect of the potential determinants of the price-
discovery metrics using a panel fixed-effects logistic regression robust to 
heteroskedasticity. The price-discovery metrics are obtained from Gonzalo and 
Granger’s (1995) methodology using rolling windows. The dependent variable takes 
a value of 1 when the bond spread reflects the information more efficiently than the 
CDS spread, while a value equal to 0 indicates that the CDS spread leads the price 
discovery process. The bond spread is defined as the difference between country A’s 
yield and the German yield. Column (1) reports the marginal effects obtained when 
we use linear daily price-discovery metrics for the period spanning December 2007– 
February 2012 (the same effects reported Column 2 of Table 3). Column (2) reports 
the marginal effects of the drivers of price discovery obtained when we use non-linear 
price discovery metrics that are obtained from a threshold VECM-model instead of 
the standard VECM model. Column (3) reports the marginal effects obtained when 
we use monthly linear price-discovery metrics (instead of daily as in Column 1) for 
the same period. The sample length is due to the use of the first 1,000 observations to 
estimate the price-discovery metric. The table contains the explanatory variables’ 
coefficients and the standard errors between brackets. *** (** and *) indicates 
whether the coefficients or effects are significant at 1% (5% and 10%) level. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Counterparty risk
Ratio CDS/bond liquidity
Financing costs
Common volatilty of EMU countries' stock index
     returns
Bonds purchased by ECB
Dummy haircut agreement by banks (July 11)
Dummy haircut agreement by banks (October 11)
Flight-to-quality indicator
Number of observations 8817 8811 432
Wald Chi2 statistic 1723 1729 113
Prob>Wald Chi2 0 0 0
Log pseudolikelihood -3393 -4289 -144
Pseudo R2 0.346 0.207 0.424
 -0.004***
0.405***
0.318**
 -0.002**0.008
0.100***
0.191***
  -0.002***
0.000
0.051***
0.000
0.027**
 -0.348***
 0.006**0.044**
 -0.195***
0.000*
0.046***
 -0.011**
0.429***
0.284***
 -0.004***
0.048**
 -0.223***
43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The CDS-bond basis for the peripheral and core countries. This 
figure shows the difference between the 5-year CDS and bond spreads (in basis 
points) for two groups of countries: peripheral (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain) and core (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and The Netherlands). 
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Figure 2: Bond Price-Discovery Metrics for Groups of EMU Countries. This 
figure shows the 30-day moving average of the Gonzalo and Granger bond 
(GGBond) price-discovery metrics for the peripheral, core, and all EMU countries. 
The price-discovery metrics are estimated using 1,000-day rolling windows. The 
metrics for each group of countries are obtained as the equally weighted average 
of the country-specific price-discovery metrics. The price-discovery metrics for 
Greece correspond to the 30-day moving average of the bond metrics for Greece. 
The values that are larger (lower) than 0.5 indicate that the bond (CDS) market 
leads the price discovery process. 
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Figure 3: EMU Bond Price-Discovery Metrics and Number of Countries 
Employed in Their Calculation: This figure shows the 30-day moving average 
of the EMU countries’ Gonzalo and Granger bond (GGBond) price-discovery 
metrics that are obtained using 1,000-day rolling windows. These metrics are 
obtained as the equally weighted average of the country-specific price-discovery 
metrics. The line shows the number of countries employed to calculate the 
average metric such that the darker the line, the higher the number of countries 
employed in its calculation. The values that are larger (lower) than 0.5 indicate 
that the bond (CDS) market leads the price discovery process. 
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